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Abstract
Active interrogation with low-energy neutrons provides a search technique for shielded highly-
enriched uranium. We describe the technique and show initial results using a low-dose 60 keV 
neutron beam. This technique produces a clear induced fission signal in the presence of small 
quantities of 235U. The technique has been validated with low-Z and high-Z shielding materials. 
The technique uses a forward-directed beam of 60 keV neutrons to induce fission in 235U. The 
induced fission produces fast neutrons which are then detected as the signature for 235U. The 
beam of neutrons is generated with a 1.93 MeV proton beam impinging on a natural lithium 
target. The proton beam is produced by a radio-frequency quadrupole (RFQ) LINAC. The 60 
keV neutron beam is forward directed because the 7Li(p,n) reaction is just at threshold for the 
proton energy of 1.93 MeV.
PACS Codes: 25.85.Ec, 29.40.Mc, 29.47.-n, 89.20.Bb
Keywords: active neutron interrogation, pulse-shape discrimination, neutron-induced fission, 
non-destructive assay
Introduction
Detection of small quantities of shielded highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is possible using a low-
dose, low-energy, active neutron interrogation technique. This technique is being applied to the 
problem of detection of illicit HEU in cargo. The technique uses a portable radio-frequency 
quadrupole (RFQ) proton LINAC to produce a forward directed 60-keV neutron beam. The 1.93 
MeV proton beam strikes a 7Li target just above threshold for the 7Li(p,n) reaction, producing a 
forward directed beam with average energy of 60-keV. The 60-keV neutron beam induces fission 
235U which then emits a spectrum of fission neutrons. The highest energy neutrons (>500keV) 
are detected with a neutron and gamma-ray pulse-shape discriminating (PSD) scintillator 
detector.
The neutron data is most informative in a two-dimensional histogram of detector pulse fall time 
versus pulse height. In a one-dimensional projection onto the time axis, this produces the familiar 
double peak spectrum from pulse-shape discrimination of gamma-rays and neutrons. Figure 1
shows one such two-dimensional plot obtained during active interrogation of 80g of 235U.  This 
was the 235U content in a 39 kg sample of depleted uranium. There is a very strong high-energy 
neutron band in the plot due to induced fission. Figure 2 shows an equivalent mass of non-235U 
containing material interrogated with 60-keV neutrons. In this case, there is virtually no neutron 
signal. Figure 3 shows the experimental layout.
The fast neutron signal occurs synchronous with the interrogating beam. This requires a 
detection system capable of ignoring the interrogating 60 keV beam while at the same time 
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detecting the induced fission neutrons from 235U. The fast neutron fission signal is detected with 
pulse-shape discriminating scintillators, calibrated to ignore the low-energy interrogating beam 
and the gamma-rays from background and other sources. Particle identification and energy 
thresholds can be set in the spectrum to count only high-energy fission neutrons produced when 
the low-energy neutron beam induces fission in 235U that is present. The technique therefore 
allows a direct detection of the 235U signature even while the 60 keV neutron beam is on. In 
addition, the technique reduces by many orders of magnitude the neutron dose required for 
detection compared to techniques using delayed gamma-ray signatures from active neutron 
interrogation. In addition, the 60 keV neutrons do not appreciably fission 238U or 232Th. This is 
because at 60 keV, the fission cross section is more than four orders of magnitude lower than that 
for 235U, as seen in Figure 4.
We mention two issues of comparison of 60 keV interrogation to interrogation with high energy 
neutrons: penetration and dose. In any active interrogation scheme, neutrons must find their way 
into the target, possibly through various shielding materials. The 60 keV neutrons penetrate 
nearly as deeply as high energy neutrons. This is because the high energy neutrons slow down by 
nuclear excitation (n, n’) reactions as well as inelastic scattering, while the 60 keV neutrons slow 
down only by inelastic scattering. The high-energy neutrons have some penetration advantage in 
hydrogenous material, roughly by the first mean free path since elastic scattering cross sections 
are smaller for high energy. (This smaller scattering cross section enables the fast fission 
neutrons created to get out.)
In non-hydrogenous cargo the thermalization path length is approximately 50 meters. If special 
nuclear material (SNM) is hidden in such cargo, the 60 keV neutrons will usually diffuse until 
they induce fission rather than being lost to capture. Table 1 shows simulation results comparing, 
for different neutron sources, the number of fissions induced in HEU per source neutron. A 5 kg 
ball of HEU (4 cm radius) is in a shipping container (2.5 x 2.5 x 6 m3). The container wall is 0.5 
cm iron. The container is sitting on a 20 cm thick concrete floor, and filled uniformly to a density 
of 0.4 g/cm3 with different materials as listed in Table 1. The neutron source is 2 m from the 
uranium ball. The 60 keV neutrons give less neutron radiation dose per neutron than high energy 
neutrons. As shown in Figure 5, the direct biological dose from 60 keV neutrons is 40 times 
lower than for 14 MeV.
High energy neutrons also create additional neutron activation due to induced nuclear reactions 
like (n, 2n). As for any active interrogation, there is a dose from neutron capture gamma-rays. 
Also, despite the forward beaming of the 60 keV beam, some neutron flux will backscatter. The 
amount of backscatter and capture gamma-rays is configuration dependent, but will be less than 
for high-energy neutron interrogation. Because essentially every induced fission produces fast-
neutrons, the strength of our interrogator probe for a scaled system is about 108 neutrons per 
second. This much less than for detection schemes based on a signal from fission fragment 
decays from only a fraction of the induced fissions.
The observation of high-energy neutron emission while interrogating with low energy neutrons is 
a powerful and direct signature of special nuclear materials. The technique is less effective for 
hydrogenous cargo and the limits in this regard are still being investigated. However, a fast-
neutron signal has been detected from hydrogenous overburdens such as polyethylene and 
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plywood as described below. Here we present experimental data to demonstrate the technique, as 
well as descriptions of the RFQ, detectors, and data-acquisition system.
Neutron Generator
An RFQ is well suited to accelerate ions in the velocity range from 0.01c to 0.1c, where c is the 
speed of light. The RFQ is, however, not suitable to accelerate electrons. The one-meter section 
of RFQ in the present portable neutron generator can accelerate protons to 2 MeV. The four 
electrodes of the RFQ (see Figure 6) are excited with quadrupole mode RF voltages to focus the 
beam. The electrodes are also modulated by the RF to produce longitudinal electric fields that 
accelerate low-velocity ions to high energy.
The fully assembled RFQ 60-keV neutron generator is shown in Figure 7. The unit can be easily 
disassembled into a top and bottom half. The two halves are connected by five cables, including 
the large 150 kW RF power cable. The top half weighs 240 lbs and contains the RFQ cavity, ion 
source, target assembly, vacuum systems, small hydrogen bottle, and control panel. The bottom 
half weighs 250 lbs and contains the compact 150 kW, 600 MHz solid state RF generator, the 
high voltage supply, and the capacitor bank. All components are air-cushion shock mounted to 
survive rough handling. All LINAC and RF functions are controlled from a compact control 
panel on top of the LINAC.
A drive loop antenna is used to couple 150 kW of 600 MHz RF into the RFQ cavity. The four vane 
tips produce a 70 kV p-p gradient and a net forward propulsion for the protons. The power comes 
from a compact 150 kW, 600 MHz solid state RF generator. The maximum duty cycle is 1%. The 
RFQ is run at a duty cycle of 0.5%. The whole LINAC system is mounted in two portable boxes 
and draws 2 kW AC power at 220V.
Ion Source
The portable 60-keV neutron generator uses a 2.5 GHz proton ECR source. The plasma is 
excited by 200 Watt of 2.5 GHz RF power. The source antenna is shaped to match the resonance 
of the 2.34 GHz amplifier peak power. A 21 kV Einzel Lens and extractor cone serves to pre-
accelerate and focus the proton beam into the RFQ LINAC.
The very small source is capable of producing 6 mA of proton current through the Einzel lens, 
and 0.8 mA of protons through the LINAC. The maximum 60 keV neutron flux in the forward 
direction is reached when the proton energy is about 1.91 MeV. If the proton energy is higher, 
most of the neutrons are emitted sideways and backward.
Target
The 7Li target consists of a 2 mm silver disk coated with the following materials:
§ 10 micro-meter natural lithium (75 keV loss) 
§ 120 nm chromium ( 8 keV loss)
§ 110 nm aluminum ( 3 keV loss)
A quadrupole permanent magnet expands the beam enough so that the lithium target does not 
melt. Close to threshold, all neutrons are emitted in the forward direction for kinematic reasons. 
Figure 8 shows the calculated energy and angle neutron distribution for an incident proton 
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energy of 1.93 MeV. An examination of Figure 8 shows that the beam is forward peaked. The 
energy in the forward direction is most intense at about 60 keV +/- 30 keV. Some of the 
neutrons, though, have energies that range from  as high as 140 keV, and down to thermal on the 
low energy side. Away from the forward direction, the energy spectrum softens. By 90º, the 
beam intensity has dropped to less than 10% of the forward intensity and the energy spectrum is 
below 10 keV.
Fast Neutron Detection
In addition to the induced fission neutrons and the presence of normal background gamma rays, 
active neutron interrogation produces gamma rays when 60-keV neutrons are captured in 
surrounding materials and a capture gamma rays are emitted. The 60 keV neutron active 
interrogation technique relies on detectors that are able to distinctly count the induced high-
energy fission neutrons in the presence of the 60-keV neutron interrogation beam and 
background gamma-rays. The most effective neutron detection materials which satisfy this 
requirement are scintillators with neutron and gamma-ray pulse-shape discrimination (PSD) 
properties. The most common of these types of detector are the xylene-based liquid scintillator 
and stilbene crystal (C14H12). These materials are sensitive to neutrons through proton recoils 
producing scintillation light. They are sensitive to gamma rays through Compton scattered 
electrons producing scintillation light. A photomultiplier tube (PMT) is attached to the 
scintillator to convert the scintillator light signal to a measurable electronic pulse. Liquid 
scintillators have a 78% intrinsic detection efficiency for 1 MeV neutrons. Discrimination 
against gamma rays with liquid scintillators using PSD is about 10 times better than for plastic 
scintillators[1].
The fission neutron detection for this work was done with a single 3” x 3” liquid scintillator 
detector connected to a neutron/gamma-ray pulse-shape discrimination (PSD) system. The 
familiar NE-213 xylene-based liquid scintillator is now available from Bicron as BC-501A and 
from Eljen Technology as EJ-301. Xylene is the bulk solvent aromatic host material. Into this 
solvent is dissolved a proprietary type and amount (usually ~0.5%) of a fluorescent compound. 
Also added is 10-100 ppm of color shifter to better match the wavelength response of 
photomultiplier tubes (PMT). Stilbene crystal has superior neutron and gamma-ray PSD 
properties but they are more difficult to manufacture.
The mechanism for distinguishing neutrons from gamma rays using PSD is the difference in light 
output decay time for electron and proton excitations. Figure 9 shows the light output time 
dependence for gamma rays, fast neutrons, and alpha particles in a stilbene crystal detector. The 
NE-213 type liquid scintillators produce similar curves.
Data Acquisition System
Many PSD techniques have been developed. The one used here involves two constant-fraction 
discriminators (CFDs) to produce a zero-crossing pulse at 10% and 90% of the amplified signal. 
A delay-line amplifier is used to produce a rectangular amplified signal from the PMT, which is 
then sent to the CFDs. This signal has a fast rise and fall time and a rapid return to baseline. This 
provides excellent timing capabilities for the zero-crossing technique. The delay-line amplifier 
used here is an Ortec 460. A start and stop CFD trigger are created in the Ortec 552 Pulse-Shape 
Analyzer/Timing SCA. The start and stop triggers are then converted to an amplitude pulse in the 
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Ortec 567 TAC/SCA. The TAC signal and the energy signal are then sent to a FAST Comtec 
multiparameter data acquisition ADC for energy and TAC coincidence measurement and 
histogramming. This results in a two-dimensional histogram as shown in Figure 1.
The data acquisition system consists of a FAST Comtec four-channel multiparameter ADC, a 
coincidence interface module, and a PCI computer control card. The energy and TAC signals 
from the pulse processing electronics are fed to channel 1 and channel 2 of the ADC. If these 
signals are coincident within a preset window (currently 3.5 ms), a histogram pixel is 
incremented by one count in the two-dimensional histogram. Color gradients are used to indicate 
the number of counts at each pixel. Software allows a region-of-interest (ROI) to be drawn 
around the well separated fast neutrons.
Experimental Results
In addition to the interrogation of depleted uranium containing 80g 235U described above, we 
interrogated a 470g sample of HEU oxide embedded in a pallet of plywood. Data in this case was 
also taken with a single 3”x3” EJ-301 liquid scintillator detector (~1% solid angle). In both 
cases, the presence of the 235U could be detected in only a few minutes with a relatively low flux 
of neutrons (~ 5 x 106 neutrons/sec). These experiments were conducted in different facilities, so 
in addition to the successful demonstration of the technique, we have also shown that the system 
is portable.
The plywood experimental setup is shown in Figure 10. Measurements were done with and 
without a 4 ft. x 8 ft. x 8 ft. pallet of plywood. The 470 g sample of HEU oxide (235U mass 
~376g) was placed on the center line of the pallet, 4 ft. up and 1 ft. from the end of the pallet. 
With the plywood present, the RFQ 60 keV neutron generator and detector were placed so that 
interrogating neutrons traveled through 2 ft. of plywood. The detected fission neutrons traveled 
through 1’ of plywood.
The results of the measurements are summarized in Figure 11. Each of the measurements was 15 
minutes. As can be seen, the measurements with beam on and HEU are 3-4s above the 
measurements with beam on and no HEU. The measurements with beam on and HEU are 5-6s
above the measurements with beam off and no HEU.
This experiment was also simulated using MCNP5. The model used plywood (48 % hydrogen, 
31 % carbon, and 21 % oxygen) with a density of 0.55 g/cm3.  The fast neutron detector  model 
consisted of a right-circular cylinder (R=3.8 cm, L=7.6 cm) filled with a xylene-based liquid 
scintillator (NE-213), and surrounded by 5 cm of lead shielding on each side except the front. 
The simulation was done in two stages. First, the induced fission yield was determined to be 
2.5´10-4 fission neutrons per source neutron. Second, fission neutrons were sourced isotropically 
and with a uniform spatial distribution within the HEU volume. The uranium was replaced with 
lead (Pb) in the simulation as a control case. The energy distribution of the fission neutrons was 
modeled as a Maxwellian spectrum with a temperature of 1.3 MeV. 
For a neutron energy threshold of 1.5 MeV, this gives ~1 x 103 counts/40 billion source neutrons 
or 2.5 x 10-8 detected neutrons per source neutron. From the experimental data above, ~90 
neutron counts >1.5 MeV were acquired in 15 minutes. The background rate with RFQ on and 
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no HEU is ~45 neutron counts. The counts above background then corresponds to ~1 x 10-8
detected neutrons per source neutron. This is in reasonable agreement with the MCNP results.
Conclusions
We have demonstrated a shielded-HEU detection technique that produces a clear positive signal 
in the presence of small quantities of 235U. The technique uses a forward-directed, low-dose 
beam of 60 keV neutrons to induce 235U fission when it is present. The induced fission produces 
fast neutrons which are then detected as the signature for the presence of 235U. Interrogation of 
non-hydrogenous commerce by 60 keV neutrons offers the best SNM detection sensitivity per 
applied dose of any technique by several orders of magnitude. The ability to observe high-energy 
neutron emission while interrogating with low energy neutrons is a powerful and direct signature 
of SNM. 
We envision an integrated system for a cargo scanning facility. This system will employ low-
dose 60 keV neutron interrogation, low-dose radiography for hydrogenous cargo, and passive 
neutron and gamma-ray detection to inspect the full range of possible cargo, with minimal 
radiation exposure for personnel and minimal activation of surrounding materials. Such a system 
can efficiently and reliably clear commerce without undue delays.
Figure 1 Two dimensional pulse-shape discrimination histogram obtained from a single 3”x3” 
liquid scintillator detector during 60-keV neutron interrogation of 80g of 235U (39 kg depleted 
uranium). Notice the clear presence of an induced fission neutron band.
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Figure 2 Two dimensional pulse-shape discrimination histogram obtained from a single 3”x3” 
liquid scintillator detector during 60-keV neutron interrogation of 30 kg of metal containing no 
235U. Notice the clear absence of an induced fission neutron band.
Figure 3 Experimental layout of 60-keV neutron interrogation of 80g 235U (39 kg depleted 
uranium).
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Figure 4 Neutron induced fission cross sections for 235U, 238U, and 232Th. At 60 keV, the 238U 
fission cross section is more than 4 orders of magnitude smaller than for 235U, and the 232Th 
fission cross section is orders of magnitude smaller still.
Figure 5 Neutron flux to dose (REM/hr)/(n/s/cm2) conversion (ANSI-91) as a function of neutron 
energy.
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Figure 6 Photograph of the radio-frequency quadrupole cavity and four vane tips (a), and a 
close up photograph of the vane tips (b).
Figure 7 Photograph of fully assembled portable RFQ 60 keV neutron generator
Figure 8 Calculated neutron beam profile distribution of energy and intensity as a function of 
angle away from the beam axis for the 7Li(p,n) reaction. The incident proton energy is 1.93 MeV.
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Figure 9 Time dependence of scintillation pulses in stilbene when excited by different incident 
particle types [1].
Figure 10 Diagram of the experimental setup with HEU embedded in Plywood.
Figure 11 Count rates for the 60 keV neutron interrogation of 470g of HEU oxide in Plywood. 
All measurements were 15 minutes in duration and obtained with a single 3”x3” EJ-301 liquid 
scintillator detector.
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Table 1 MCNP Simulation of Fission Probability per Source Neutron for Various Materials
Cargo
Source Water Aluminum (Al) Iron (Fe) Lead (Pb)
60 keV 
(directional)
3.9e-8 3.9e-4 4.3e-4 4.6e-4
2.5 MeV 
(isotropic)
9.3e-7 9.5e-5 6.9e-5 6.6e-5
7 MeV 
(isotropic)
1.3e-5 9.4e-5 7.6e-5 7.5e-5
14.1 MeV 
(isotropic)
3.2e-5 9.6e-5 1.0e-4 1.2e-4
[1] L. M. Bollinger and G. E. Thomas, Reviews of Scientific Instruments 32, 1044 (1961).
[2] Passive Nondestructive Assay of Nuclear Materials, Doug Reilly, Norbert Ensslin, 
Hastings Smith, Jr., and Sarah Kreiner, editors; 1991, LA-UR-90-732.
